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Abstract: Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is a technique where multiple cognitive radio users cooperate among themselves
to make the binary decisions about the presence of primary user. Single cognitive user often faces the hidden terminal problem.
However, CSS tackles this problem by sending their local sensing based decisions to the fusion center. Major drawback of con-
ventional energy detection is that, at low signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime its performance is very poor. In this work, likelihood
ratio statistics is considered as a test-statistic due to its highest statistical power and an improved likelihood ratio statistic based
CSS scheme is proposed by considering several past sensing events. Proposed scheme mitigates the poor detection at low SNR
regime and misdetections arising due to sudden drops in signal energy. We compute the lower bound for likelihood ratio statistic
based sensing. We also analyse the effect of non-Gaussian noise on the sensing performance. Furthermore, the generalized
Byzantine attack is taken into account considering a security aspect. The proposed scheme is also shown to outperform Anderson
Darling based malicious user detection in CSS at low SNR regime. The proposed scheme is verified and validated over empirical
spectrum data. The improvement in performance is at cost of computational time at lower sample size, which in practice is very
low and is justified by the significant performance improvements of the proposed scheme at low SNR regime.
1 Introduction
The wireless sector has witnessed a paradigm shift in recent past in
terms of number of subscribers for different wireless services and
technologies. Also, the fixed spectrum management policy which
has an advantage of avoiding the interference among different wire-
less systems suffer two disadvantages. One being its inability to roll
out new radio technologies and services; and another that although
the spectrum has been allocated to wireless services, it is highly
underutilized [1]. As per the recent survey [2], many spectrum occu-
pancy campaigns across the globe have proved that the utilization of
spectrum is very low.
To mitigate the problem of increasing spectrum demand, the con-
cept of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) or Opportunistic Spectrum
Access (OSA) or Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged as a promis-
ing solution [3]. CR has two types of users, licensed users generally
referred to as primary users (PU), and unlicensed users referred to as
secondary users (SU). SU scavenges for the opportunity (referred to
as spectrum sensing) to find some vacant space (referred as spectrum
holes or white spaces [1]) across frequency, time or space and uti-
lize that without interference as long as PU is inactive (i.e, spectrum
hole is available). However, as soon as PU becomes active, the SU
has to immediately vacate the allocated spectrum in a non-interfering
manner.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Spectrum sensing is a primary function of CR and has been an
important aspect of research. It can be broadly classified into para-
metric and non-parametric approaches. Parametric approach is the
one in which the secondary CR user requires the a-priori knowl-
edge of the PU’s signal. As per the survey in [4], techniques
like using information from geolocation and database using beacon
signals, cyclostationary feature detection, matched filter detection
and so on fall under the category of parametric sensing. On the
other hand, more robust non-parametric approaches include energy
detection (ED) [5], improved energy detection (IED)[6], Anderson
Darling(AD) test [7], and likelihood ratio statistics (LRS-G2) based
spectrum sensing [8], wherein no prior knowledge of the PU signal
is required.
Spectrum sensing, although appearing simple, in reality is a diffi-
cult task and various challenges have been addressed in the literature.
In [9] it is stated that sensing is difficult as different PUs would be
employing different modulation schemes, transmission powers, dif-
ferent data rates, etc. Another problem encountered in implementing
spectrum sensing is when singly operating SU terminal is shadowed
in severe multipath fading or due to buildings with high penetra-
tion loss while the PU operates in the vicinity, usually referred to as
hidden terminal problem [9]. The solution to the above mentioned
problems is addressed in [10]-[11] by a technique called Cooper-
ative Spectrum Sensing (CSS). In this technique different SUs in
close geographical location report their sensing based decisions to
the common node, referred to as fusion center (FC).
ED based CSS was discussed in [9] and [12]. Furthermore, a
better approach called Improved Energy Detector based CSS was
proposed in [13] wherein ED is modified by replacing the squaring
operation of the received signal amplitude with an arbitrary power.
However, a major drawback for ED based spectrum sensing is that
its performance is very poor in low SNR regime [14]. Another lim-
itation of ED based localized sensing at the SUs is that at low SNR
it might send an erroneous decision to the FC and this may have
impact specially when all the SUs send wrong decisions and the FC
uses AND fusion rule.
Furthermore, in addition to the above mentioned limitation, users
in CSS may act maliciously and send a erroneous decision at FC.
There are few works in the literature which have addressed the
malicious user detection problem in CSS. For instance, a robust
malicious user detection scheme was studied in [15]. Authors in [16]
have focused on the security aspects of CSS using AD based good-
ness of fit test. Trust based mechanism for malicious user detected in
CSS was proposed in [17]. Similar recent works can be found in [18],
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Table 1 Literature summary of related works
Reference CSS ED basedsensing
IED and
improved
energy
detector
AD based
sensing
LRS based
sensing
ILRS based
sensing
Malicious
user detection
Analysis under
non-Gaussian
noise
Use of
empirical
data for
verification
[5] × X × × × × × × ×
[6] × X X × × × × × X
[7] × × × X × × × × ×
[8] × × × × X × × × ×
[9] X X × × × × × × ×
[12] X X × × × × × × ×
[13] X × X × × × × × ×
[16]-[19] X X × X × × X × ×
[21] × × × × X × × × ×
[26] × × × × X × × X ×
Our
contribution X X × X X X X X X
[19] and references therein. However, the previous studies have con-
sidered the attacks restricted only to specific type and not in general.
An indepth study of generalized Byzantine attacks under dynamic
and static CSS scenario is carried out in [20] and [21]. Moreover,
all the above mentioned works have considered the Gaussian noise
at the receiver. On the contrary, we have considered the effect of
non-Gaussian noise in CSS.
Numerous work has been carried out in literature in which spec-
trum sensing has been treated as a hypothesis testing problem or
goodness of fit test problem. In [7], AD sensing based on goodness
of fit was proposed which was corrected in [22]. In [8], LRS-G2 has
been proposed which has outperformed prevailing sensing schemes
like ED based, AD sensing, and other order statistic based sensing.
In [23] the likelihood ratio based goodness of fit using χ2 distri-
bution was proposed which outperformed ED at low SNR. In [24],
sensing method based on statistical test which outperforms ED based
sensing at low SNR has been proposed. Also in [25], Kernalized gen-
eralized likelihood ratio test based statistical method for spectrum
sensing was proposed, which used nonlinear kernel to map input
data onto high dimensional feature space. However, it needs histor-
ical database of PU and thus falls under parametric sensing. All the
above methods are used for non CSS scenario. Table 1 provides a
brief summary of related work in literature in the context of CSS.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, there is very limited work car-
ried out in literature like [26] in which statistical methods based
sensing have been applied at the SUs to overcome the sensing prob-
lem at low SNR regime in CSS. In this work, we apply the statistical
method based spectrum sensing as in [8] at all the SU nodes. Fur-
ther, we propose an improved version of likelihood ratio statistic
test (ILRS) in which abrupt or instantaneous changes in the signal
leading to misdetections are taken into consideration. Moreover, the
malicious user detection is taken into consideration and implemented
using proposed scheme. The proposed scheme is verified with hard
combining rule (AND and OR) for both (LRS and ILRS) schemes
using empirical data captured through a test-bed setup. Furthermore,
we consider the realistic assumption of non-Gaussian noise at the
receivers, which has a more prominent effect in CSS.
1.2 Contributions
Our main contributions in this article can be summarized as below:
• Firstly, the effect of non-Gaussian noise arising due to vari-
ous sources at the receiver in case of cooperative spectrum sens-
ing by considering middleton class A noise is studied. Also, the
effect of ratio of Gaussian to non-Gaussian component on pro-
posed sensing scheme, LRS and CED at SUs is demonstrated. The
proposed scheme performs better than LRS and CED even under
non-Gaussian noise.
• Secondly, we derive the lower bound for probability of detection
Pd for LRS based sensing in accordance with the comments from
[22] and verify the result using different values of sample size.
• Thirdly, we apply the statistical method based spectrum sensing
(LRS) at all the SU nodes to alleviate the degrading effect of ED
based sensing at low SNR regime. We then propose an ILRS based
sensing at all the SU nodes in which we apply an additional check in
comparing the few previous values of test statistic with the threshold
so as to avoid the misdetections arising due to abrupt signal changes.
Further, we verify the proposed scheme on empirical data of various
radio technologies acquired using an USRP test-bed setup. Experi-
mental results prove that ILRS hard decision based sensing at all the
nodes outperforms the LRS and ED based CSS.
• Lastly, security aspect is taken into consideration whereby users
in cooperation act maliciously and report the falsified hard decisions
at FC. An ILRS based malicious user detection is proposed and is
shown to outperform the AD based malicious user detection in CSS
[16], which considers that malicious user always report yes at the
FC. In addition, we also consider the scenario wherein the SU may
not always report yes at FC, known as Generalized Byzantine attack
which is more realistic.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the system model under Gaussian noise and non-Gaussian noise.
Section 3 describes the CSS which further provides the insights
of ED based localized sensing in section 3.1, LRS based sens-
ing in section 3.2 and decision based sensing at the FC in section
3.3. Lower bound for detection probability for LRS is computed in
Section 4. The proposed ILRS based cooperative sensing scheme
is described in Section 5. Proposed scheme based malicious user
detection in CSS is studied in Section 6. Section 7 provides the
comprehensive study of empirical test bed setup for spectrum data
acquisition. Simulation results are discussed in Section 8. Section 9
focuses on the comparative study of computational time and com-
plexity of various spectrum sensing schemes. Section 10 draws
conclusion from this work.
2 System Model
2.1 Cooperative spectrum sensing under Gaussian noise
We consider the total number of CR users to beN under cooperation,
one FC and one PU transmitter (Tx) as shown in Fig. 1. The chan-
nel is sensed by the N CR users to determine whether it is idle or
busy. Thus depending on the channel occupancy state, we form two
hypotheses. One, the channel being idle i.e, PU is inactive (absent)
denoted as hypothesis H0 and other that the channel is busy i.e, PU
is active (present) denoted as hypothesis H1.
Mathematically, it can be represented as
yi(t) =
{
wi(t), H0
him(t) + wi(t), H1
(1)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N, yi(t) is the received signal at ith SU, m(t) is
the transmitted signal from PU, hi represents the complex channel
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Fig. 1: Considered system model
coefficient of sensing channel between PU and ith SU and wi(t)
denotes white and circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
noise with zero mean and variance σ2w , represented as CN (0, σ2w).
PU and SU are assumed to be equipped with single antenna.
However there are few assumptions considered in this article as
in [27]:
• Channel is assumed to be time invariant during during each
sensing event, but can change across different sensing events.
• Each SU remains silent during each sensing event.
• Each SU remains more or less static at its position. This ensures
that the decisions from SU does not change due to mobility of SU.
• Decision is made by the FC only after the decisions arrive from
all the SUs, regardless of the fusion rule.
• We assume that the SUs are in the sensing range of FC and PU.
2.2 Cooperative spectrum sensing under non-Gaussian
noise
There are instances where the non-Gaussian behaviour of noise
needs to be considered. As in [28], broadly there are three sources of
non-Gaussian noise. Firstly, this may be due to natural phenomena
such as lightning and radiation from the sun, cosmic, and extrater-
restrial solar, etc. This type of interference is commonly called
atmospheric noise, due to inherent source (inherent noise within
electronic equipment) or may be due to man-made source [29].
Although non-Gaussian behaviour can be modelled as Class-A, B,
C and symmetric alpha stable (sαs) distributions, for the sake of
brevity we restrict ourselves to class-A model. As there are as many
receivers in cooperative sensing as SUs, it is important to consider
the effect of non-Gaussian noise.
We consider the non-Gaussian behaviour of noise in cooperative
sensing and reformulate the hypothesis testing problem as,
H0 : FY (y) = F0(y),
H1 : FY (y) 6= F0(y), (2)
where F0(y) will be the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of Middleton class-A noise and FY (y) is the empirical distribution
of the received signal, represented as
FY (y) =
|{s : ys ≤ y, 1 ≤ s ≤ n}|
n
, (3)
where s = 1, 2, .., n, |.| denotes the cardinality and n is the sample
size. F0(y) is the CDF of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) noise samples.
The Class-A probability density function (PDF) can be expressed
as [30]:
fX(x) =
∞∑
d=0
e−dA
d
d!
 1√
2piσ2d
 e−x22σ2d (4)
where σ2d =
d/A+Γ
1+Γ . The class-A model can be fully described by
parameters A and Γ. A is the overlap or impulse index, which is the
product of the average number of emission events impinging on the
receiver per second. Mean duration of a typical interfering source
emission is A ∈ [10−2, 1] time units. The smaller the value of A,
the more “structured" (in time) the interference is. Conversely, the
larger the value ofA, the more Gaussian and less structured the noise
is. When A = 1, the noise is Gaussian [30]. Also Γ is called the
Gaussian factor and it is the ratio of intensity of the independent
Gaussian component to the intensity of the impulsive non-Gaussian
component. Γ lies in the range of [10−6, 1].
3 Cooperative spectrum sensing
3.1 Energy detection based localized sensing
Energy detection is an non-parametric approach for spectrum sens-
ing. In this method we compute the energy of the received signal
from PU as,
Y =
2
N0
∫T
0
|yi(t)|2dt (5)
where N0 is the one sided noise power spectral density. When
hypothesis H0 is accepted (i.e, when PU is not present) we have
yi(t) = wi(t). Y follows central chi-square (χ2) distribution with
2u degrees of freedom. On the other hand, when hypothesis H1 is
accepted (i.e, when PU is present) we have yi(t) = him(t) + wi(t),
under such case Y follows non central chi-square (χ2) distribu-
tion with 2u degrees of freedom [31]. The parameter u denotes the
time-bandwidth product.
One important parameter in deciding the above formulated
hypothesis is decision threshold (λi). For the sake of brevity we
directly state the closed form expression for probability of detec-
tion Pd,i, probability of false alarm Pf,i and probability of missed
detection Pm,i at ith SU respectively from [31].
Pd,i = Qm(
√
2γi,
√
λi) = 1− Pm,i (6)
Pf,i =
Γ(u, λi2 )
Γ(u)
(7)
where Qm denotes Marcum Q function, Γ(., .) is the incomplete
gamma function and Γ(.) is the Gamma function. Energy threshold
is represented by λi and γi represents instantaneous SNR at ith SU.
3.2 Likelihood Ratio statistic (LRS) based localized sensing
In this technique, we consider the sensing as a goodness of fit test
problem. When sufficiently large samples (n) of the received sig-
nal is taken and if PU is absent, Y can be regarded as a samples
drawn from noise distribution F0(y) and vice-versa as considered in
(2). However, as H0 corresponds to absence of PU, i.e. noise only
samples, the distribution F0(y) will have Gaussian distribution [8].
This scheme is applied at N SUs and the localized binary deci-
sions about the channel occupancy is forwarded to the FC. Expres-
sion in (8) is used to compute the measure between FY (y) and
F0(y). The detailed summary is explained in detail in Algorithm-1.
3.3 Decision at the Fusion Center
Once the locally sensed decision from all the SUs about the channel
activity (either idle or busy) is made, it is reported at the FC through a
reporting channel. At FC, all the decision are fused together (step 20
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Algorithm 1 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing using LRS
1: Generate randomly located N SUs and define sample size(n), values
of Pf , read the signal and compute SNR
2: for kk ← 1 to length(Pf) do
3: Pf_AND(kk) = Pf (kk)N
4: Pf_OR(kk) = 1− (1− Pf (kk)N )
5: prob_majority=0
6: for c = floor(N/2)+1:N do
7: prob_majority=prob_majority+ nchoosek(N, c)*(Pf(kk)c)*((1-
Pf(kk))N − c)
8: end for
9: Pf_Majority(kk) = prob_majority
10: Declare LRS_detection_AND, LRS_detection_Majority and
LRS_detection_OR of Montecarlo length times
11: for b← 1 to iter i.e, length (montecarlo times) do
12: Define a temporary variable LRS_detection_temp
13: for K ← 1 to last frame of signal do
14: for N ← 1 to no. of SU’s do
15: Model the channel, noise and compute the received
signal
16: Compute the Zc statistic as below
Zc =
n∑
s=1
[
log
{
F0(y[s])−1 − 1(
n− 1
2
)
/
(
s− 3
4
)− 1
}]2
(8)
where n is the sample size and F0(y[s])−1 is the inverse
17: of the CDF of the received signal (as computed above)
18: if Z_C >= c_value_C(Pf == Pf (kk)) then
19: LRS_detection_temp(N )← 1
20: else
21: LRS_detection_temp(N )← 0
22: end if
23: Repeat for all SU nodes
24: end for
25: if Product(LRS_detection_temp) == 1 then
26: LRS_detection_AND← 1
27: end if
28: if Sum(LRS_detection_temp) > floor(N/2) then
29: LRS_detection_Majority← 1
30: end if
31: if 1-Product(LRS_detection_temp) 6= 0 then
32: LRS_detection_OR← 1
33: end if
34: end for . Increment the frame
35: end for . Repeat for the Monte Carlo times
36: LRS_Pd_AND(kk) = sum(LRS_detection_AND) / iter
37: LRS_Pd_Majority(kk) = sum(LRS_detection_Majority) / iter
38: LRS_Pd_OR(kk) = sum(LRS_detection_OR) / iter
39: end for
through 24 in Algorithm-1 and step 27 through 31 in Algorithm-2)
as per the following “l out of N” logic rule [9].
YFC =

∑N
i=1Decisioni < l; H0∑N
i=1Decisioni ≥ l; H1
(9)
where l represents the decision threshold at FC. When decision is
made at l=1, it implies that even if any one SU has sensed the pres-
ence of PU, the FC will conclude that the PU is present. This is also
called OR fusion rule. On the other hand, the FC will conclude the
presence of PU only when all the SUs have sensed the presence of
PU. This is called AND fusion rule. Similar to the Pf,i and Pm,i
at SUs, false alarm and missed detection probability for cooperative
sensing is given by (10)-(11). As we have a binary decision about
the presence of PU, it is reasonable to assume that both probabilities
follow binomial distribution.
Qf = Prob[H1|H0] =
N∑
l=l
(
N
l
)
P lf (1− Pf )N−l, (10)
Qm = Prob[H0|H1] = 1−
N∑
l=l
(
N
l
)
P ld(1− Pd)N−l, (11)
As both Qf and Qm infer to the error probabilities, the sum of
Qf and Qm, (Qf + Qm) implies the total error rate [13].
4 Computation of Lower Bound on Detection
Probability for LRS
The signal received at the SU can be written as,
yi(t) = hi
√
γm(t) + wi(t), (12)
where yi(t) is the received signal at the ith CR, γ is the received
SNR, m(t) is the transmitted signal and wi(t) is the Gaussian noise
with zero mean and unit variance. Considering AWGN channel, we
have hi = 1 in (12). Also, one SU is considered for simplicity.
In absence of PU, yi(t) is equal to wi(t) i.e, hypothesisH0. Thus
the distribution function F0(y) under such hypothesis can be written
as,
F0(y) =
1√
2pi
∫y
−∞
e−x
2/2dx
However when the PU signal is present, the received observations
yi(t) will follow hypothesis H1. Also the transmitted signal m(t)
from PU is the empirical signal captured using test bed setup, in
accordance to [22] but as opposed to m(t) = 1 in [7]. The mean of
such distribution will be m
√
γ and will have a unit variance. Thus,
the distribution F1(y), under hypothesis H1 can be written as
F1(y) =
1√
2pi
∫y
−∞
e−(x−m
√
γ)2/2dx
In [32], authors have proposed a new hypothesis test based on
power divergence statistics for null-hypothesis testing as,
2nIϕ =
2n
ϕ(ϕ+ 1)
{
Fn(t)
[
Fn(t)
F0(t)
]ϕ
+ [1− Fn(t)]
[
1− Fn(t)
1− F0(t)
]ϕ
− 1
}
(13)
where, ϕ represents a parameter for selection of goodness of fit
test, n and Fn(t) denote sample size of received observations and
empirical CDF respectively.
By selecting ϕ = 0, (13) represents Likelihood Ratio Statistics
(LRS-G2) as,
G2 = 2n
{
Fn(t) log
Fn(t)
F0(t)
+ [1− Fn(t)] log 1− Fn(t)
1− F0(t)
}
(14)
In [33], authors have proposed a parametrization approach to con-
struct a generalized omnibus GoF test for a specified distribution
(F0) under hypothesis H0 as normal distribution using different
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weight functions. They have proposed general test statistics called
as Z statistics using,
Z =
∫∞
−∞
zt φ(t) dt, (15)
where zt indicates a type of GoF test statistics and φ(t) denotes
weighting function. For likelihood ratio statistic as per (14) and (15)
we have
Z =
∫∞
−∞
G2 φ(t) dt, (16)
Z =
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
Fn(t) log
Fn(t)
F0(t)
)
+ [1− Fn(t)] log 1− Fn(t)
1− F0(t)
]
× φ(t)dt,
(17)
On further simplification, we have
Z =
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
Fn(t)(logFn(t)− logF0(t))
)
+ [1− Fn(t)](log(1− Fn(t))
− log(1− F0(t))
]
× φ(t)dt.
(18)
We approximate the log(x) terms and log(1− x) terms in the above
equation as per the Taylor series expansion [34]. Considering only
the first order term, as Fn(t) and F0(t) are the CDF values, it is
fair to ignore the higher order squared terms. Thus approximating
log(x) ≈ (x− 1) and log(1− x) ≈ −x
Z =
∫∞
−∞
2n
[
Fn(t)
(
(Fn(t)− 1)− (F0(t)− 1)
)
−
(
1− Fn(t)
)(
Fn(t)− F0(t)
)]
× φ(t)dt
(19)
On solving further, we obtain
Z =
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
Fn(t)− F0(t)
)(
2Fn(t)− 1
)]
× φ(t)dt,
(20)
The detection probability Pd of LRS is given by,
Pd,Z = P (Z > τ |H1) = 1− FZ,H1(τ), (21)
where τ is the threshold. We upper bound the FZ,H1(τ). Thus we
have,
Z ≥
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
F1(t)− F0(t)
)(
2Fn(t)− 1
)]
φ(t)dt
−
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
Fn(t)− F0(t)
)(
2Fn(t)− 1
)]
φ(t)dt,
(22)
where the inequality is due to inequality of triangle. Let us assume,
C =
∫∞
−∞
[(
F1(t)− F0(t)
)(
2Fn(t)− 1
)]
× φ(t)dt
and
Bn =
∫∞
−∞
2n
[(
Fn(t)− F0(t)
)(
2Fn(t)− 1
)]
× φ(t)dt
Thus we have, Z ≥ C(2n)−Bn. Now, as per the definition of CDF
and using Markov’s inequality,
FZ,H1(τ) = P {Z ≤ τ |H1}
= P
{
e−κZ ≥ e−κτ |H1
}
≤
E
[
e−κZ
]
e−κτ
≤
e−κC(2n)E
[
e−κBn
]
e−κτ
(23)
For simplicity, considering the multiplier constant, κ = 1. Thus
we have,
FZ,H1(τ) ≤
e−C(2n)E
[
eBn
]
e−τ
(24)
and
Pd ≥ 1−
e−C(2n)E
[
eBn
]
e−τ
(25)
The lower bound value for probability of detection is shown in
(25). As per the analysis in [35], the distribution B2n|H1 will con-
verge as n→∞ and C is a constant. A similar analysis was carried
out in [7] in which the PU signal considered wasm(t) = 1. However
as per [22] it is not very appropriate to consider the primary signal
m(t) = 1. Adhering to the comments in [22], we have considered
the PU signalsm(t) as empirical data of different radio technologies,
the details of which are given in section 7.
5 Proposed Improved likelihood ratio statistic
(ILRS) based Cooperative sensing scheme
The results obtained using LRS scheme suggest that the detection
performance can be improved if the misdetections caused by the
sudden changes in the signal energy drops are avoided [6]. This moti-
vates us to apply an improved version of likelihood ratio statistics
in which apart from the present event, the average of past L sens-
ing events is taken into consideration for calculating the Zc statistic
(Algorithm-2; line 16).
Consider the scenario as shown in Fig. 2 where the PU signal is
present throughout, however at instant ‘b’ there is a sudden drop in
the energy of signal which may cause misdetection. If average of
the Zc statistic of past L events is taken into consideration, then Zc
average will be greater than decision threshold resulting in declar-
ing the channel to be busy (i.e, hypothesis H1). The summary of
the Algorithm is explained in detail in Algorithm-2. An important
parameter that needs to be addressed is the number of past sensing
events L that is to be considered for computing Zc average. This is
discussed in detail in the results section.
Fig. 2: Motivation for the proposed scheme
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Algorithm 2 Proposed scheme for Cooperative spectrum sensing
1: Generate randomly located N SUs and define sample size(n), values
of Pf , number of past events (L), read the signal and compute SNR
2: for kk ← 1 to length(Pf) do
3: Pf_AND(kk) = Pf (kk)N
4: Pf_OR(kk) = 1− (1− Pf (kk)N )
5: prob_majority=0
6: for c = floor(N/2)+1:N do
7: prob_majority=prob_majority+ nchoosek(N, c)*(Pf(kk)c)*((1-
Pf(kk))N − c)
8: end for
9: Pf_Majority(kk) = prob_majority
10: Declare ILRS_detection_AND, OR and Majority.
11: for b← 1 to iter i.e, length (montecarlo times) do
12: Define a temporary variable ILRS_detection_temp
13: for K ← 1 to last frame of signal do
14: for N ← 1 to no. of SU’s do
15: Model the channel, noise and compute the rx. signal
16: Compute the Zc statistic as below
Zc =
n∑
s=1
[
log
{
F0(y[s])−1 − 1(
n− 1
2
)
/
(
s− 3
4
)− 1
}]2
17: if No. of past events > L then
18: test_mean← (Z_C(K-1)+...+Z_C(K-L)) /L
19: else
20: test_mean← Z_C(K)
21: end if
22: if Z_C >= c_value_C(Pf == Pf (kk)) then
23: ILRS_detection_temp(N )← 1
24: else if
25: Test_mean >= c_value_C(Pf == Pf (kk))
26: ILRS_detection_temp(N )← 1
27: else
28: ILRS_detection_temp(N )← 0
29: end if
30: Repeat for all SU nodes
31: end for
32: if Product(ILRS_detection_temp) == 1 then
33: ILRS_detection_AND← 1
34: end if
35: if Sum(ILRS_detection_temp) > floor(N/2) then
36: ILRS_detection_Majority← 1
37: end if
38: if 1-Product(ILRS_detection_temp) 6= 0 then
39: ILRS_detection_OR← 1
40: end if
41: end for . Increment the frame
42: end for . Repeat for the Monte Carlo times
43: ILRS_Pd_AND(kk) = sum(ILRS_detection_AND) / iter
44: ILRS_Pd_Majority(kk) = sum(ILRS_detection_Majority) / iter
45: ILRS_Pd_OR(kk) = sum(ILRS_detection_OR) / iter
46: end for
6 Proposed Scheme based Malicious user
detection in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
Security is an important concern in cooperative sensing. In this
section we consider the situation wherein SUs in cooperation act
maliciously in a way that they try to falsify the sensing result by
indicating the presence of PU (i.e., PU in busy state), even when they
are actually not present in order to monopolize the spectrum and pre-
vent other SUs from accessing the spectrum opportunities [16]. To
address the above scenario, AD based GoF test for malicious user
detection scheme was used in [16], which tests whether empirical
distribution from SUs fit the expected distribution for malicious user.
The binary hypothesis for local sensing at SUs are formulated
similar to (1). However, for simulation and to show a fair compar-
ison of AD based malicious user detection in cooperative sensing
[16] and proposed scheme (LRS and ILRS based malicious user
detection), we consider that the transmitted signal m(t) from PU
is quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulated signal with unit
transmit power and the channel is characterized as Rayleigh faded,
i.e, hi(t) = CN (0, σ2v).
In malicious user detection, as mentioned earlier, the empirical
distribution from SUs is compared with the expected distribution for
malicious user. If both distributions match well, we can conclude
that the SU is malicious and exclude its test statistic for considera-
tion at the fusion centre [16]. The empirical distribution of the ith
secondary user after the kth sensing interval is finished is given as
[36],
F
(i)
k (y) =
1
k
k∑
p=1
1(yi(p) ≤ y) (26)
where 1(α) is the indicator function which equals 1 if α is true and
zero otherwise.
For sufficiently long sensing period k (i.e, as k →∞), F (i)k (y)
converges to the malicious user distributionFM (y) or non-malicious
user distribution FN (y). As the malicious user always reports binary
one, i.e, presence of PU (H1 hypothesis), the distributionFM (y) can
be written as,
FM (y) = F (y|H1) (27)
However, as non-malicious or legitimate users send the true deci-
sion to the FC about the presence of PU, the distribution FN (y)
according to the total probability theorem can be written as,
FN (y) = P (H0)F (y|H0) + P (H1)F (y|H1) (28)
where P (H0) and P (H1) are the probabilities of PU being in the
free or busy state, respectively.
In [16], AD statistic is used to determine the empirical distribution
A
(i)
M (k) = −
1
k
k∑
j=1
(2j − 1)[logFM (yj:k)
+ log(1− FM (yk+1−j:k))]
(29)
where yj:k is the j
th smallest value among k reported local test
statistics. Once A(i)M (k) is computed for each SU, it is compared
with the cutoff threshold η. IfA(i)M (k) < η, the i
th SU is considered
malicious and its local test statistic is cut off from the global sensing
decision [16].
According to [8], LRS outperforms AD sensing. Moreover, LRS
has highest statistical power in all GoF tests [8]. To the best of our
knowledge, no work in the literature has considered the LRS-based
detection of malicious user in cooperative spectrum sensing. Thus,
instead of calculating the empirical distribution of SUs as per (29),
we calculate the empirical distribution at each SU, as mentioned in
[8] as follows:
Z
(i)
c =
n∑
s=1
[
log
{
F0(y[s])
−1 − 1(
n− 12
)
/
(
s− 34
)− 1
}]2
(30)
where Z(i)c is the Zhang statistic computed at the ith SU and other
terms are similar as per the equation of Zc in Algorithm-1 and
Algorithm-2.
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Fig. 3: Measurement platform deployed in this study.
Table 2 Channels measured in this study and USRP configuration
Radio
Technology
Channel
Number Fstart(MHz) Fcenter(MHz) Fstop(MHz)
Signal
Bandwidth
(MHz)
Gain (dB) DecimationRate (M)
Sampled
Bandwidth
(MHz)
FM Broadcasting 96.500 96.700 96.900 0.2 45 64 1
U - 29 534 538 542
UHF Television
Band-IV U - 33 566 570 574 8 45 8 8
27 940.2 940.4 940.6
E-GSM(900) DL 77 950.2 950.4 950.6 0.2 45 64 1
120 958.8 959 959.200
DCS (1800) DL 690 1839.6 1840.8 1841 0.2 45 64 1
The cut-off probability for a malicious user pcutM (i.e., the proba-
bility that a malicious user is detected and cut off) is calculated in a
way such that it remains higher than a target value ζ as follows [16]:
pcutM = Pr(Z
(i)
c < η | user i is malicious) ≥ ζ (31)
Further, simulation shows that ILRS and LRS performs similar
for the detection of malicious user and thus we have restricted our
analysis to LRS based malicious user detection.
7 Measurement and Experimental Setup
7.1 Empirical Setup
We deployed a measurement setup for data acquisition on the roof-
top of School of Engineering and Applied Science (SEAS), GICT
building of Ahmedabad University. The measurement setup is as
shown in Fig. 3. It includes both hardware and software. Hardware
consists of digital spectrum analyzer (Rigol DSA-875), a univer-
sal software radio peripheral (USRP-N210) with a WBX daughter
board surmounted, two D3000N super discone antenna and a com-
puter system to interface the hardware and software. The software
part includes MATLAB and GNURadio. The measurement setup is
similar to the one deployed in [37] and [38].
7.2 Spectrum Data Acquisition
Spectrum data is crucial in validating any proposed algorithm/scheme.
Table 2 shows the channels measured in this study and the USRP
configuration. We captured the spectrum data across four radio tech-
nologies namely FM broadcasting, UHF TV Band, E-GSM 900
downlink and DCS 1800 downlink. The prime reason for captur-
ing the data across varied bands is to check the generalization of the
proposed scheme. To make sure that the signal is actually present
in the channel, we tune the spectrum analyzer to the desired chan-
nel/frequency band and look at the power spectral density on the
analyzer’s screen. We can clearly discriminate whether signal is
present or absent (i.e, channel is idle or busy). This ensures that
we are not receiving any noise only samples. This exercise is more
useful in case of discontinuous power transmitters (e.g, GSM-900
and GSM-1800 downlink) to determine the presence of signal in the
desired channel. Table 3 shows the tuning parameters of spectrum
analyzer.
Table 3 Parameters of spectrum analyzer
Parameter Value
Frequency range 75-2000 MHz
Frequency span 45-600 MHz
Frequency bin Depends on band selected
Resolution Bandwidth-RBW 10 kHz
Video Bandwidth-VBW 10 kHz
Measurement period 5-15 mins
Sweep time 1 second
Scale 10 dB/division
Input attenuation 0 dB
Detection type RMS detector
Two D3000N super discone antennas were connected, one with
USRP and other with spectrum analyzer. The D3000N super dis-
cone antenna is an ultra-wideband antenna covering amateur radio,
commercial 2-way, cellular, air traffic control and various utility fre-
quency bands. It covers a frequency range of 25-3000 MHz. It is
vertically polarized and has a nominal gain of 2 dBi. As the sensi-
tivity is a key issue in spectrum measurements, we used the inbuilt
pre-amplifier which amplifies all the incoming signals. As we have
restricted our measurements maximum up-to 3000 MHz, there was
no need of external amplifier as such. Also the length of co-axial
cable was limited to the required range so as to avoid the loss of
signal strength of incoming signals. Rigol DSA-875 spectrum ana-
lyzer supports 601 frequency points. Also as per the discussions in
[39] a resolution bandwidth (RBW) of 10 kHz was selected and a
sweep period of 1 second was kept. The frequency bins selected in
the spectrum analyzer were kept slightly wider than those selected
in USRP. This ensures that we are not missing the extreme points of
the selected frequency bins.
Data acquisition and spectrum measurement was conducted on
monday morning from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM. These timings only
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affect the discontinuous transmitters. We used a Dell-i7 embed-
ded processor personal computer (PC) system and connected the
spectrum analyzer with PC using instrument control toolbox of
MATLAB for quick access. Various environmental factors like tem-
perature, humidity, moisture, dew, rain, etc., need to be considered
as elaborated in [38]. However, as our measurement was of short
duration we did not consider such factors into measurement account.
For data acquisition, the controlling computer runs the GNU
radio’s script to collect the digital samples (I/Q data) from USRP.
Once the data are captured, off-line processing is performed in MAT-
LAB and then the proposed scheme is applied on the stored data to
check its validity.
8 Simulation Results and Discussion
Several experimental and simulation results are provided to validate
the proposed scheme for CSS. Note that in all of the figures, n is
the sample size, N is the number of SUs and L is the number of
past sensing events considered. For the results in Fig.7-9, the PU
signal captured using the empirical test bed is forwarded to N SUs,
considering the assumptions in Section-II. Further, randomly located
SUs are generated and as SNR levels at SUs is unknown, AWGN is
added to obtain appropriate SNR for simulations.
Fig.4 shows the effect of non-Gaussian noise components on
detection probability at the SU in accordance with [28]. The plot of
detection probability Pd vs ratio of Gaussian to non-Gaussian com-
ponentΓ at SNR=-5dB and impulse indexA = 0.1 for CSS is shown.
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Fig. 6: ROC comparison of proposed scheme, LRS and ED
Five secondary users are considered. The plot compares the detec-
tion probability under non-Gaussian noise for the proposed scheme,
LRS and CED. As conveyed from the plot, the proposed scheme
outperforms LRS and CED for non-Gaussian noise considered at
SU. Also we can observe from plot that at low Γ, the non-Gaussian
component will be dominating and the proposed ILRS scheme per-
forms better than CED and LRS in non-Gaussian environment as
well. This can be ascribed to the smart combination of the test statis-
tics across sensing events that the proposed ILRS scheme performs,
which helps prevent missed detections (regardless of the type of
noise) caused by sudden energy drops below the decision thresh-
old, which are particularly likely to occur at low SNR conditions (as
considered in Fig. 4). This operating principle leads to an improved
detection performance of the proposed method in several operation
conditions as it will be shown in the subsequent results presented in
this section.
Fig.5 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot for
lower bound of LRS. It is depicted that detection probability Pd → 1
with theO(e−C(2n)) as n→∞. It is interesting to note that the Pd
lower bound of LRS is better than the Pd of ED for all the values of
n, which suggests a better performance as demonstrated experimen-
tally in this section. This result indicates that the LRS statistic tends
to lead to a better performance than the conventional ED method
and this is, in part, where the improved performance of the proposed
ILRS method comes from (in addition to the smart combination of
the LRS statistics from several sensing events).
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Fig. 6 shows the ROC plots for comparison of proposed scheme,
LRS and ED sensing across GSM at -5dB SNR and for sample size
n = 30. Also, the ROC plot compares the (a) OR rule, (b) Majority
voting rule and AND fusion rules at FC. It is obvious that detection
probability will be better in case of OR fusion rule. It is clear from
the plot that ILRS OR rule outperforms ILRS AND fusion rule at
the FC. ROC plot demonstrates that the performance of proposed
scheme outperforms both, LRS and ED based CSS at low SNR.
However, the improvement in performance is at the cost of nomi-
nal computational time as would be discussed in Section 9. Another
interesting observation from Fig. 6 is that the performance of the
proposed ILRS scheme is significantly less sensitive to the fusion
rule used at the FC, showing a consistent high performance in all
cases, while the other considered schemes can sometimes lead to a
lower performance, in particular when the majority voting and the
AND rules are employed. This is somehow natural since the OR rule
is more permissive with missed detections (i.e., it is enough to have
one or few busy channel states correctly detected in order to correctly
report the channel as busy), while on the other hand the majority
voting and AND rules require most or all of the busy states of the
channel to be correctly detected, and here missed detections have a
more degrading effect. By overcoming the impact of missed detec-
tions caused by sudden energy drops, the proposed ILRS scheme
leads to a better performance, also with the majority voting and AND
rules. As a result the proposed ILRS scheme consistently outper-
forms the other methods regardless of the fusion rule used at the
FC.
Fig.7a shows the probability of detection versus SNR of proposed
scheme (for different values of L), LRS and ED based sensing at
SU for captured GSM data, Pf = 0.001, sample size n =30 and
300, using AND fusion rule at FC. It is clear from the plot that LRS
based sensing outperforms ED sensing. However for localized sens-
ing at SUs, as mentioned in Algorithm-2, we have also considered
the past L sensing events so as to avoid any misdetection due to
instantaneous drop in signal. The main challenge in considering the
past events is in deciding the number of past sensing events L that
should be taken into consideration. It is obvious that higher the value
of L, less will be the chances of misdetection due to instantaneous
drop, but at the cost of longer execution time and larger memory
requirements of storing the previous values. We have considered
three values of L (i.e, L = 3, 5, 7). We can depict from Fig.7a that
the proposed scheme outperforms LRS and ED based CSS in the
low SNR regime. Fig.7b shows the plot of probability of detection
versus SNR, with number of past sensing events L added as a third
dimension for n =300. The obtained results show, as expected, that
increasing the number of sensing eventsL combined by the proposed
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ILRS scheme, a better probability of detection can be obtained.
However, while the performance improvement from L = 3 to L = 5
is noticeable (in particular when a low sample size such as n=30 is
considered), the improvement from L = 5 to L = 7 is not so signif-
icant, at least in the region of high probability of detection (0.9 and
above), which is the operating region of interest. Therefore, L = 5
can be considered as a good tradeoff between the performance of
the proposed scheme and its computation time and memory require-
ments (to store past sensing events). It is also worth noting in Fig.
7 that the enhanced probability of detection of the proposed ILRS
scheme can lead to sensitivity improvements at Pd = 0.9 of up to 4
dB with respect to the conventional ED scheme and about 3 dB with
respect to the standard LRS scheme.
Fig.8 shows the fusion rule comparison at SU using comple-
mentary receiver operating characteristic (CROC) for the proposed
scheme for N = 5 and 10. The plot demonstrates three fusion rules
at the FC i.e, (AND, majority & OR). In AND rule, FC makes the
final decision about the channel only if the binary decisions of all
the SUs are one. In majority rule, the final decision at the FC is
made when majority of the SU reports one. On the other hand, in
OR rule even if one SU sends its localized binary decision to be one,
the FC decides the presence of PU. It is clear from the plot that OR
rule outperforms AND fusion rule for both, GSM in Fig.8a and UHF
TV in Fig.8b. Similar performance has been obtained for other radio
technologies as well. Moreover, it is intuitive from Fig.8 that, as the
number of SUs reporting to FC increases, the performance improves
(i.e, lower will be the missed detection probability at particular value
of false alarm). This is valid for all three, AND, Majority and OR
fusion rules.
Fig.9 shows the plot of cut-off probability for non-malicious users
pcutN versus cut-off probability for malicious users p
cut
M . As per [16]
and references therein, the probability of PU being in busy state
is assumed to be 20%, i.e, P(H1) = 0.2. Total number of SUs is
assumed to be 30 out of which 5 SUs are always malicious and
the sample size is taken as n = 50 samples. The cut-off probabil-
ity for a malicious user pcutM is calculated according to [19 - eq.(6)]
and as per (31) for different target cut-off probabilities and similar
calculation is carried out for cut-off probability for a non-malicious
user pcutN at different SNR. Simulation result in Fig.9 shows that the
proposed scheme clearly outperforms the AD based malicious user
detection for CSS in terms of cutting off the malicious user even
in the low SNR regime. For example, at -14 dB SNR, pcutM > p
cut
N
for both schemes. However, for the proposed LRS-based malicious
user detection scheme, the pcutN is lower at a particular value of p
cut
M ,
which shows its applicability.
Fig. 10 indicates the plot of error probability v/s the percentage
of malicious users considered for the proposed scheme. As similar
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Fig. 10: Performance of generalized Byzantine attacks in CSS for
n = 50, no. of SUs = 30.
to the fig. 9, we consider the no. of SUs to be 30 and n = 50. Addi-
tionally, we also consider that P (H0) = 0.8 and P (H1) = 0.2. It is
evident that OR and AND saturates at P (H0) and P (H1) respec-
tively, since they always declare the channel as either busy or idle.
Thus, OR and AND rule will remain same for always yes and always
no case. However, notice that the majority rule saturates at 0.8 for
always yes case and at 0.2 for always no case.
9 Computational time and Complexity Analysis
Computational complexity is another metric used to quantify the
computational cost of an Algorithm. In this context, computational
complexity of ED, IED, LRS and proposed scheme are compared for
CSS. Computational complexity for ED [5] isO(nK). However, for
cooperative sensing one more iterative loop is included which equals
the number of SUs (N) and thus it results in the complexity order
of O(nNK). IED in [6] includes past few samples to improve the
performance over ED. However that does not contribute in compu-
tational order and thus it has same computational order of O(nK).
Also similar to cooperative ED sensing, it has the complexity order
of O(nNK).
LRS based sensing has very high statistical power however it
comes at a computational cost. LRS based sensing has the compu-
tational complexity of the order O(n2N log(n)) wherein n log(n)
is contributed due to inverse CDF in line 16 of Algorithm-1, n is
contributed due to summation term in the same line. Increase in the
complexity order by N is due to the iterative loop which is equal to
the number of SUs in line 14 of Algorithm-1 and K is due to line 13
of Algorithm-1.
The proposed scheme differs from the LRS based cooperative
sensing in a way that later considers past L samples into account
for calculating the test statistic as per line 17 of Algorithm-2. How-
ever it does not contribute in computational order and thus the
proposed scheme has the same computational complexity of order
O(n2N log(n)) as that of LRS based cooperative sensing while pro-
viding additional performance improvements. Table 4 provides the
summary of computational complexities of various spectrum sensing
schemes for cooperative spectrum sensing.
Table 4 Computational complexity for CSS
Spectrum sensing scheme Computational order
Energy detection (ED) O(nNK)
Improved Energy detection (IED) O(nNK)
Likelihood Ratio Statistics (LRS) O(n2N log(n)K)
Proposed Scheme (ILRS) O(n2N log(n)K)
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Fig.11 shows the comparison of computational time of different
schemes as observed in the simulations on MATLAB platform in a
PC with an Intel Core i7 processor at 3.60 GHz. It is evident from
Fig.11 that at lower sample size (n < 50) the computational time of
CED is slightly lower than for LRS and the proposed scheme. We
can also note that for different values of L, the computational time
is almost similar. The extra cost of computational time is in practice
very low and is justified by the significant performance improve-
ments as shown in simulation results section. Another important
thing to mention here is that in order to obtain a satisfactory detection
performance, the sample size n needs to be relatively large and in
that region the computation time is similar. Therefore the improved
performance is obtained at very low increase in the computational
time.
10 Conclusions
In this work, the localized sensing at SUs in cooperation is studied.
We have considered LRS as a test statistic, due to its highest sta-
tistical power, for localized sensing at SUs in cooperative spectrum
sensing to mitigate the poor performance of ED at low SNR. Further,
an Improved LRS for CSS is proposed in which the past L sensing
events is considered so as to avoid misdetections caused due to sud-
den drops in signal energy. From numerical results and discussion
we conclude that the proposed ILRS scheme outperforms LRS and
ED based CSS at low SNR regime.
The proposed scheme has been concretely verified with empir-
ical spectrum data of various radio technologies. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme outperforms ED and LRS based sensing under
non-Gaussian noise distribution of SUs. Also, taking into considera-
tion the security aspect in CSS wherein users in cooperation may
act maliciously by reporting false hard decisions at FC, the pro-
posed scheme has outperformed AD based malicious user detection
in CSS even at low SNR of -14 dB considering that malicious user
always report yes at the FC. In addition, we have also considered
a more realistic Generalized Byzantine attack wherein the SU may
not always report yes at FC. ROC, CROC and detection probability
versus SNR plots also indicates the better performance of proposed
scheme as compared to ED and LRS in CSS at low SNR regime.
The computational time analysis indicates that at lower sample size,
CED has lower time complexity than LRS and ILRS schemes but at
higher sample size, computational time is almost similar. The extra
cost of computational time at lower sample size is in practice very
low and is justified by the significant performance improvements of
the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the complexity order of LRS and
proposed scheme is same in CSS. As LRS and ILRS perform better
than CED at low SNR regime, these sensing schemes can be used as
a future scope to obtain PU activity statistics with better accuracy, a
problem which has been untouched in literature till date, and will be
addressed in our future work.
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